

his Timaeus; where he, being to treat of the cosmogonia, preiniseth this distinction concerning two heads of being—that some were eternal and never made, and some again made or generated; the former whereof he calls oiwa, or essence, the latter •ysveoric, or generation ; adding also this difference betwixt them, that the eternal and immutable things were the proper objects of science and demonstration, but the other generated things of faith and opinion only;

o, TI yap 7rpOf yzveaiv ovaia, TOVTO irpog TTKTTLV

aX?J0aa, for what essence is to generation, the same is certainty of truth or knowledge to faith,— And thereupon he declares, that his reader was not to expect the same evidence and certainty of truth from him, where he was now "to treat of things generated (namely, the gods, and the visible world), as if he had been to discourse about things immutable and eternal, in these words:

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qv ovv9 <) Zw/cparac, •zroAAa TTOAAWV stTrovrvw
irepi Of<ov /ecu rr]c TOV wavroQ yfEVfffa)Cj
&C. If, therefore, O Socrates, many things having been spoken by many men, concerning the gods and the generation of the universe, we be not able to discourse demonstratively concerning the same, you ought not at all to wonder at it, or be displeased with us; but, on the contrary, to rest well satisfied with our performance, if upon this argument we do but deliver probabilities.—Where the gods are by Plato plainly referred to yweai^ and not to ov<na; to generation, and not to eternal or immutable_t essence, as they are also joined with the gener&tipn of the world, as being but a part thereof. Neither is this at all- to be wondered at in Plato, since first the whole visible world was